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ABSTRACT 
Electricity generation is becoming more and more 
decentralized. This trend requires management of the 
electricity grid at a more granular level by Distribution 
System Operators than before. To this end, local energy 
communities (LECs) are being piloted throughout the 
world. However, this granular control requires the use 
of more privacy-sensitive information than we are used 
to. In particular, this entails more frequent meter 
readings, over short intervals of 15 minutes or less. 
Therefore, privacy should be taken into account in the 
design of these LECs. In addition, they should comply 
with data protection laws. This paper reports on our 
experience with applying the Privacy by Design 
approach in GridFlex, an LEC pilot project. We 
describe and reflect on the process followed and 
summarize the results. We hope that this proves useful 
for other projects facing these issues. 
INTRODUCTION 
With renewable energy generation (solar power in 
particular) the classical view of the electricity grid, 
where energy flows from a few large production 
facilities out to the consumers, has become obsolete. 
Generation is now also decentralized. With solar panels 
in use, consumers might switch to being producers and 
back to being consumers multiple times per day, or even 
per hour. Distribution System Operators (DSOs) are 
responsible for ensuring that there is sufficient 
connection capacity to service each consumer – both for 
energy demand, but also for supplying energy back to 
the grid. Demand shaping, i.e. influencing demand to 
match the supply and capacity, is one technique to 
reduce the amount of copper needed – and hence the 
costs – to meet peaks in demand. 
 
Different ways of demand shaping are being explored 
by DSOs. One option is to provide incentives to 
consume electricity at exactly those moments when 
there is locally generated power in abundance. Another 
option is in-home batteries. These provide a reliable 
form of power storage that can be charged during the 
day with the solar power being generated, then used 
during peak time or the night. Local energy 
communities, which we abbreviate to LECs, provide 
opportunities to test these techniques. 
 
Both options require an accurate, fine-grained model of 
the grid. The information used for this can be privacy-
sensitive [1,2]. Additionally, LEC projects often include  
 
some form of feedback to the consumer, or may try to 
stimulate collaboration between consumers. This also 
involves privacy-sensitive information. 
 
To ensure that consumer privacy is adequately taken 
into account, it should be part of the design process. 
Privacy by Design is one approach to this [3]. Privacy 
by Design and Privacy by Default are mandatory since 
the European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) has come into force [4]. The GDPR uses the 
term data protection instead of privacy; though for 
brevity and clarity, we use privacy. 
 
In this paper we explain what applying Privacy by 
Design means in general and for LECs in particular. We 
describe the approach we took, in a collaboration 
between Radboud University and GridFlex Heeten, to 
apply Privacy by Design in a Dutch LEC project. We 
highlight the issues encountered that are likely to be 
present in other LEC projects. We also show the ways 
in which we mitigate privacy concerns and explain the 
rationale behind these choices. 
GridFlex Heeten 
GridFlex Heeten (http://gridflex.nl/) is a pilot project in 
the Dutch village of Heeten to explore market and 
control models for an LEC. Dutch DSO Enexis is one of 
the project partners. The goal is to experiment with 
price incentives to optimally match local energy 
consumption, storage, and production. The project is 
centred on a single neighbourhood. Each household is 
equipped with solar panels, in-home batteries, or both. 
In addition, a large solar station is present nearby. 
 
The project is both a research- and a production-project. 
The first four years are mainly for research into price 
incentives and grid control. After these four years, the 
research-project will end. However, it is likely that the 
project will continue as a controlled LEC afterwards. 
Fine-grained metering data will be collected and stored 
by the project partners running the project infra-
structure. Additionally, a research database based on 
this data will be shared with the University of Twente. 
 
Measurements from smart electricity meters will be 
used to monitor and manage the LEC and to build the 
models for studying incentivization. Smart electricity 
meters in the Netherlands can send this data directly to 
the DSO in intervals no shorter than 15 minutes [5]. 
However, for effective monitoring and analysis, more 
granular, one-minute-interval readings are necessary. 
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The meters can provide this data only on a local 
interface, requiring equipment connected directly to the 
smart meter to send this data to the project partners. 
Collecting measurements at this high level of detail 
implies several privacy issues, which we discuss below. 
 
In order to build accurate models, household compo-
sition is used to characterize the consumption profile of 
a connection. This information is also privacy-sensitive. 
PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
Privacy by Design (PbD) [3,6] is a design and 
engineering approach intended to ensure privacy 
protection from the earliest stages of a project, not just 
in hindsight. The idea is that privacy concerns are 
considered throughout the entire project lifecycle, from 
the earliest concept formulation, to design process, 
implementation, deployment, and, if applicable, 
decommissioning. By considering privacy from the 
beginning, costs and complexity of redesign when 
privacy issues are discovered can be largely avoided. 
 
The GDPR makes application of PbD mandatory [4]. 
PbD has consequences such as forbidding data 
processing that is disproportionally invasive, and 
requiring allocation of resources towards ensuring 
consumer privacy. The GDPR also requires Privacy by 
Default, meaning that the strictest privacy settings 
should be the default. 
 
PbD is a somewhat vague concept. To make its 
underlying goals more concrete, more specific privacy 
design strategies have been proposed [7]: 
1. minimize: only collect that data which is strictly 
necessary, and remove that which no longer is. 
2. hide: encrypt, pseudonymize, and take other 
measures that protect and obscure links between 
elements of data and their source. 
3. abstract: reduce the granularity of data collected; 
combine or aggregate data from multiple sources so 
that the sources are no longer uniquely identifiable. 
4. separate: store and access data only where it is used; 
process data at the source instead of centrally. 
5. inform: explain to data subjects how their personal 
data is processed, and how profiles and automated 
decision-making based on their personal data work. 
A subject can only provide valid consent to data 
processing if they understand how their data is being 
processed. 
6. control: allow data subjects to provide and revoke 
consent to process, and to access, correct, and delete 
their provided and derived data. 
7. enforce: build technical and organizational measures 
that ensure the design decisions taken with regard to 
privacy are actually implemented, and log the actions 
of the systems. 
8. demonstrate: document, audit, and report on the 
operational and PbD processes. 
The first four strategies are more focused on data. The 
last four are about policies and the surrounding 
processes. Given these strategies, the PbD process could 
then ideally be implemented as follows: look at each 
project requirement, figure out what potential privacy 
impacts it has, and apply strategies to mitigate those 
impacts. This should be an iterative process, which is 
repeated as the design becomes more detailed or 
changes in other ways. The first step in each iteration 
involves performing a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) 
[8], or rather, refining the assessment from the previous 
iteration. Unfortunately, standardization of the PbD 
process in general is still lacking and the subject of 
further research [9]. 
 
Still, in absence of such standardization, the PbD 
process can take the form of several meetings between 
project stakeholders where for each project requirement 
the privacy impact on the end-user is estimated, and all 
these strategies are considered. For this to be effective, 
people who possess sufficient experience and domain 
knowledge to deduce privacy issues from project (data) 
requirements must be present. The outcome is ideally 
twofold: a set of design documents stipulating in detail 
the measures that must be taken in implementing the 
project design, and a keen awareness of the privacy 
considerations among project architects and developers. 
 
In the case of GridFlex, however, we became involved 
after the architecture had, for the most part, already 
been designed. Therefore, our approach was a 
retroactive one, applying strategies with the intent to 
redesign the architecture where possible [10]. We held 
three meetings, each half a day long. Business architects 
from all project partners were present at these meetings, 
not just from the partners developing the soft- and hard-
ware. The reason for this is that design requirements are 
made for business reasons. In order to determine 
appropriate implementations of strategies, it is essential 
for the process to have a representative present who is 
able to explain and discuss those business reasons. Lead 
software developers were not present during these 
meetings. In retrospect, we believe that they should also 
have been included in this process. The project partners 
feel that this would improve engagement and awareness 
of the software developers, which privacy requirements 
in documentation may not be able to achieve. 
 
The outcome of this process was a set of applied 
strategies in a document, with rationale included. The 
next section summarizes these. Additionally, a PbD 
manual, for use by the project partners, is being 
developed. 
PRIVACY ISSUES IN GRIDFLEX 
This section summarizes the main privacy issues in the 
GridFlex project, and the design choices that were made 
as part of the PbD process. 
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Fine-grained metering data 
For grid control in an LEC such as GridFlex, real-time, 
fine-grained measurements are required. The 
measurements of household connections are used 
because in GridFlex, smart grid equipment is managed 
per household. The granularity here is a problem, 
because it provides a detailed insight into the personal 
lives of the members of a household. 
 
To put this into perspective: the initial smart meter roll-
out in the Netherlands was postponed because the 
original law proposed that the DSOs take 15-minute-
interval measurements by default. This was found to be 
in violation of article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights [11,12]. 
 
In GridFlex, the granularity of measurements has been 
chosen to be even smaller. It is currently one minute, 
and may be reduced further during the project. The goal 
is to determine whether these measurements provide 
advantages in running an LEC, and whether those 
advantages outweigh the additional cost of privacy-
protecting measures. During the research phase of the 
project, the metering data will also be used as basis for a 
research database by the University of Twente. 
 
For this privacy problem, the following strategies were 
deemed most effective on the data level: Abstract is 
applied by taking the measurements on a minute-
granularity, rather than the 10 seconds that the interface 
allows. Minimize takes the form of only collecting the 
energy usage, not other information available on the 
interface. Hide is then applied by pseudonymizing the 
data before transmission to the central system and by 
encrypting the data in transit. Separate is applied by 
limiting access to the data to those parties that strictly 
require it: the project partner doing actual grid control, 
and the University of Twente for research purposes. 
 
On the process level, we inform the data subject via 
informational meetings before they sign up, and in the 
customer’s project contract when signing up for the 
project. Control is provided through a customer portal. 
 
Once the research phase ends, the data collection for the 
university also ends, but the infrastructure will remain 
and will probably become part of the normal grid. This 
infrastructure will still have additional control 
capabilities, and if deemed successful, the project will 
likely enter its production phase. If the fine-grained 
metering data is still required at that point, the 
architecture should be reviewed and changed to not 
store metering data any longer than is necessary for the 
actual grid control decisions. 
Customer identity and location information 
Another class of personal data processed includes 
customer names and addresses, which are needed when 
the project partners need to contact the consumer. 
Storage of this data by all project partners, and in 
relation to the energy usage information, however, is not 
needed and (hence) not acceptable. 
 
Instead, separate is applied by having a single project 
partner store a database linking customer name and 
address to a pseudonymized identifier. This project 
partner does not need access to the measurement data, 
so concerns are kept separate. For partners that store 
information that may need to be relinkable to the 
customer name and address, we follow the hide strategy 
and use the pseudonymized identifier instead. For 
example, the energy measurements might indicate a 
need to perform on-site maintenance by an engineer. 
The party determining this could simply contact the 
project partner which holds the linking database, and 
tell them that an engineer needs to visit the household 
linked to that pseudonym. There is then no need for that 
partner to learn the customer's identity. 
Household composition 
In GridFlex, the goal is not just testing an LEC, but also 
creating standard profiles for prediction and planning. 
To this end, users are asked to provide information on 
the composition of their household, which is needed to 
understand different usage patterns to base the profiles 
on. However, there are several ways to go about this, 
and similar to the previous point, it is not needed and 
(hence) not acceptable to store this information with all 
project partners. 
 
The impact is mitigated by several strategies. First, hide 
is applied by storing household data with the 
measurement data under a pseudonymous identifier, 
rather than with the customer identity and location 
information. Second, abstract is applied by only 
characterizing the household, rather than using the 
precise composition or even identities of people in the 
household. Third, separate is applied by only storing 
the household composition in the research database, and 
not at each project partner. Finally, because this data is 
only required for research purposes, it suffices to 
sample part of the project participants. Therefore, 
minimize can be applied by making household 
composition optional: customer opt-in is requested, and 
participation in the project is still possible if the 
customer prefers not to provide this data. Of course it 
may impede the accuracy of the established profiles if 
many households choose to withhold this data, but this 
trade-off was deemed acceptable. Finally, this data will 
be destroyed after the research phase is finished. 
 
Customer opt-in is only valid if the customer is 
accurately and understandably informed. Therefore, we 
inform the customers through informational meetings 
where the project is explained and where they can ask 
questions about the data processing. In addition, the 
project's contract with the customer will have 
explanatory text accompanying the opt-in form. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Even though we were not involved from the start of the 
design phase, the Privacy Design sessions that were 
held in GridFlex proved useful, considering that several 
measures were taken to significantly reduce potential 
privacy impacts. Examples include storing data only 
with the parties that actually need it, separating the data 
from direct identifiers such as name and address through 
the use of pseudonymization, and minimizing the data 
collected, as explained in the previous section. Ideally, 
however, Privacy by Design should have been applied 
from the beginning of the project. 
 
Although Privacy by Design as a concept is becoming 
well-known, it turns out that there is not much 
standardization in how to actually apply it [9]. One 
document of interest to local energy communities is the 
standardized Data Protection Impact Assessment 
template for Smart Grids [13,14]. 
 
In retrospect, for the effectiveness of Privacy by Design, 
we believe both project architects and the lead software 
developers should be included in Privacy by Design 
meetings. This ensures engagement and awareness 
amongst the people implementing the decisions, which 
may not be achieved by only communicating privacy 
requirements through documentation. 
 
One thing we noticed at the meetings is that pseudo-
nymization and anonymization are still often confused. 
It is important to realize that an identifier is still an 
identifier, whether that is a full name or a random 
number. So pseudonymization, where we replace full 
names by some random number, does not necessarily 
provide anonymization. Even though these numbers 
look more anonymous than the names, it may well be 
possible to reconstruct the associated name [15,16]. 
 
Local energy communities may become the new 
standard for managing the electricity grid. If that 
happens, opting out may be difficult due to social or 
political pressure. This makes it even more important to 
adequately protect consumer privacy. Privacy by Design 
provides a structured approach towards achieving this. 
We have shown how this can be applied to a local 
energy community pilot, which issues such a pilot is 
likely to encounter, and how they can be mitigated. 
 
A major design decision in the electricity grid of the 
future is the trade-off between usage of smart grid 
technology and concepts, and usage of additional grid 
infrastructure. This is beyond the scope of individual 
pilot projects such as GridFlex, but a broader discussion 
seems warranted. Putting more copper in the ground 
would accommodate higher peak demand.
More advanced measures – including more IT – may 
manage supply and demand in an effort to reduce peak 
demand. Lower peak demand reduces the amount of 
copper needed. Copper is expensive, but so is rolling 
out and securing a complex IT infrastructure. The 
optimal trade-off may not be easy to determine. This 
trade-off will also have an impact on privacy, so copper 
could effectively act as a privacy-enhancing technology. 
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